Question One. Whether Beatitude Consists per se in Operation

1. “But after the resurrection,” [Lombard, Sent. IV d.49 ch.1 n.1].

2. About this forty ninth distinction I ask whether beatitude consists per se in operation.

3. That it does not:

Augustine On the Trinity XIII.5.8 (after rejecting other definitions [ibid. 4.7-5.8]) infers this one: “    Therefore the blessed is he who both has everything that he wants and wants nothing wrongly.” Therefore , beatitude consists in having everything that is willed well; many things are willed well that are different from operation; therefore etc     . This is confirmed from Boethius Consolation 3 prose 2 n.3, “Beatitude is a state perfect by aggregation of all goods;” then, as before, this does not consist in operation alone;     therefore etc     .

4. Again, beatitude consists in being conjoined with the beatific object; that conjoining is a relation; operation is something absolute;     therefore etc     . There is a confirmation: an absolute can remain, without contradiction, in the absence of a respect founded on it, because it is naturally prior to such respect; a respect to an object is founded on operation; therefore operation can remain without such respect to an object. But without it [such respect] there is no beatitude, otherwise there would be beatitude and not in a beatific object.

5. There is argument from the idea of beatitude: first from the definition; second from the object; third from permanence; it could, fourth, be argued from the subject, but this will be touched on in the next question [nn.61-65]. From operation the argument is: first from the agent cause; second from the proximate cause, which is a habit.

6. Again, according to the Philosopher Ethics 1.13.1102a5-6, it belongs to the idea of beatitude that it be present in a complete life (otherwise the happy man could become wretched, and otherwise too the blessed would not have the end of all his desires); because not only does anyone desire well-being but also to be in that good state permanently. Operation however is transient and in a state of becoming, and so it does not have in its idea that it is present in a complete life;     therefore etc     .

7. Again, no agent is more perfect from the fact that it produces something by its action; but he who operates is in some way a producing cause of his operation;     therefore he is not more perfect simply through his operation. But the blessed is more perfect simply through his, namely, through beatitude; therefore etc     . The proof of the first proposition is that the effect is not the perfection simply of the agent, since the agent is either equally perfect (namely if it is univocal with the effect) or more perfect than the effect (if it is equivocal with the effect). There is a confirmation, that if what is more perfect should thus come from what is more imperfect, then it is changed simply; but it is unacceptable for an agent, in the respect it is agent, to change, according to the Philosopher, Physics 3.1.201a27-b4, because then it would be in potency in the respect it would be in act. There is also a confirmation, that the blessed is not the effective cause of his beatitude, because then he would beatify himself; but he is the effective cause of his operation;     therefore etc     .

8. Again, a habit is a perfection simply more perfect than act; beatitude is the noblest perfection; therefore beatitude consists more in habit than in act. Proof of the first point: first because, according to the Philosopher Topics 3.1.116a13-14, “a more lasting good is better;” a habit is a good more lasting or permanent than act, because a habit is difficult to move, an act passes at once; and second because habit is a cause of act, otherwise he who has the habit would not act more easily or perfectly than he who does not have it. But it is only a cause as efficient cause (as is plain by running through the causes), and is not an univocal efficient cause (as is plain);     therefore it is an equivocal efficient cause; so it is nobler.

9. To the opposite:

Ethics 1.9.1099a30-31, 5.1097a15-b6, “Happiness is the best operation etc     .”

10. Ethics 10.8.1178b7-22 Aristotle makes this specific by the operation it consists in, when he deduces that the gods, whom we judge most happy, have operation because of the fact that “everyone supposes them to be alive (and not to be sleeping), therefore supposes them to operate; wherefore the operation of God will be excelling in speculative happiness.”

11. Likewise, Metaphysics 12.9.1074b17-18, when speaking about divine understanding, he says, “If God does not understand, what will be striking or worthy of veneration in him? But he is disposed as one sleeping.” Ibid. 7.1072b24, “and speculation is a thing most delightful and best.” And a little later [1072b26-28], “and life exists [for God], for the act of the intellect is life” and he adds, “the divine is the very act, and the act is the best life.”

12. Likewise Metaphysics 9.8.1049b4-50a3, “Act is prior simply to potency,” not only prior in time and definition, but also in substance, that is, in perfection; and this third member he proves [1050a4-b16] by the fact that potency is for the sake of act, as he shows by induction in both natural and artificial things; therefore act is ultimate, not for the sake of anything else, but especially when it is operation and not making. Hence he concludes “wherefore happiness too” (supply: consists in operation); and he proves it, “for [happiness] is a certain sort of life.”

13. Again On the Heaven 2.3.286a8-9, “Every substance that has an operation is for the sake of its operation.”

14. Likewise Augustine On Christian Doctrine 1.32 n35, “The supreme reward is that we enjoy him,” namely God; but the supreme reward is blessedness according to him, and to enjoy God is an operation.